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All the ideas for 'reports', 'Theaetetus' and 'Philosophical Investigations'

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98 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are always switching direction to something more interesting [Plato]
What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Understanding mainly involves knowing the elements, not their combinations [Plato]
Either a syllable is its letters (making parts as knowable as whole) or it isn't (meaning it has no parts) [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Eristic discussion is aggressive, but dialectic aims to help one's companions in discussion [Plato]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We master arithmetic by knowing all the numbers in our soul [Plato]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There seem to be two sorts of change: alteration and motion [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
If a word has no parts and has a single identity, it turns out to be the same kind of thing as a letter [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Things are only knowable if a rational account (logos) is possible [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Expertise is knowledge of the whole by means of the parts [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein]
It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
How can a belief exist if its object doesn't exist? [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is infallible, suggesting that it is knowledge [Plato]
Our senses could have been separate, but they converge on one mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
With what physical faculty do we perceive pairs of opposed abstract qualities? [Plato]
Thought must grasp being itself before truth becomes possible [Plato]
You might mistake eleven for twelve in your senses, but not in your mind [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
An inadequate rational account would still not justify knowledge [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Parts and wholes are either equally knowable or equally unknowable [Plato]
Without distinguishing marks, how do I know what my beliefs are about? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
What evidence can be brought to show whether we are dreaming or not? [Plato]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If you claim that all beliefs are true, that includes beliefs opposed to your own [Plato]
Clearly some people are superior to others when it comes to medicine [Plato]
How can a relativist form opinions about what will happen in the future? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein]
To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein]
If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein]
One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein]
If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein]
An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein]
Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands]
We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein]
In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein]
Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein]
Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein]
If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein]
We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein]
If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein]
If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton]
Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein]
To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 3. Actions and Events
What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Jesus said learning was unnecessary, and only the spirit of the Law was needed [Jesus, by Johnson,P]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love your enemies [Jesus]
Love thy neighbour as thyself [Jesus]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
Treat others as you would have them treat you [Jesus]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter heaven [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
If you lust after a woman, you have committed adultery [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Don't resist evil, but turn the other cheek [Jesus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
It is almost impossible for the rich to go to heaven [Jesus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
No one is good except God [Jesus]
God must be the epitome of goodness, and we can only approach a divine state by being as good as possible [Plato]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Jesus turned the ideas of Hillel into a theology reduced to its moral elements [Jesus, by Johnson,P]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / b. Religious Meaning
Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There must always be some force of evil ranged against good [Plato]